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REFUSING TO “KISS THE GREAT WRIT 
GOOD-BYE”: THE NINTH CIRCUIT, IN 
DOODY v. RYAN, IGNORES THE SUPREME 
COURT’S CUES REGARDING FEDERAL 
HABEAS RELIEF 
Abstract: On May 4, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
in Doody v. Ryan held that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ application of 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent regarding Miranda warnings was unrea-
sonable. Therefore, it granted the defendant federal habeas relief under 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). In so doing, 
the Ninth Circuit once again displayed an improper understanding of the 
AEDPA and the requisite deference it must apply to state court decisions. 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court should adopt a more pre-
cise unreasonableness standard to curtail the Ninth Circuit from defying 
congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent. 
Introduction 
 In its 2000 opinion, Williams v. Taylor, the U.S. Supreme Court con-
sidered for the first time the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act (AEDPA).1 Central to that case was section 2254(d)(1) of the 
AEDPA that authorizes federal courts to grant habeas petitions only if 
the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent or un-
reasonably determined the facts of the case.2 In granting the defen-
                                                                                                                      
 
1 529 U.S. 362, 367, 398–99 (2000) (concluding that the defendant in a capital murder 
sentencing had been denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of 
counsel when the defendant’s counsel failed to present and explain significant mitigating 
factors, and holding that it was unreasonable for the Virginia Supreme Court to have de-
cided otherwise); see Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253–2255, 2261–2266 (2006). 
2 529 U.S. at 367; see § 2254(d)(1). Under Title I of the AEDPA, Congress limited the 
authority of federal courts to grant the writ of habeas corpus. § 2254(d)(1). Congress en-
acted these changes to “further principles of comity, finality, and federalism, to encourage 
exhaustion of state remedies, and to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal 
criminal sentences—particularly in capital cases.” Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Construc-
tion and Application of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)—U.S. Supreme 
Court Cases, 26 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1, 1 (2008); see Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional 
Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal Courts-Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 
86 Geo. L.J. 2445, 2449–50 (1998) (asserting that Congress enacted the AEDPA to limit 
federal authority for granting prisoners relief in response to “the populist sentiment that 
31 
32 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
dant’s habeas petition, the Court emphasized an important difference 
between an “incorrect” application and an “unreasonable” application 
of clearly established federal law.3 Although the Williams Court failed to 
explain exactly what makes a decision unreasonable instead of merely 
incorrect, in the decade since, Supreme Court precedent has directed 
lower federal courts to give a high level of deference to state court deci-
sions.4 
 On May 4, 2011 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, granted habeas relief under the AEDPA in Doody v. 
Ryan (Doody III).5 Although the Supreme Court has attempted to clarify 
the AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the Ninth Circuit has re-
peatedly exploited the lack of a precise unreasonableness definition 
after Williams.6 Moreover, because the Supreme Court has denied cer-
tiorari in this case, the Ninth Circuit will continue to grant habeas relief 
without proper deference to state court decisions until the Supreme 
Court creates a more precise definition of unreasonableness.7 
                                                                                                                      
courts are mollycoddling prisoners”); William J. Meade, Case & Statute Comment, The 
Demise of De Novo Review in Federal Habeas Corpus Practice, 85 Mass. L. Rev. 127, 132 (2001) 
(explaining that the AEDPA “marks a great shift” to a system of federal review which more 
properly respects state courts’ decisions). Section 2254(a) of the AEDPA prohibits federal 
courts from entertaining applications for habeas corpus from individuals in state custody 
unless the individual is in state custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 
§ 2254(a). The statute reads, in pertinent part: 
[A]n application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be granted . . . 
unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was con-
trary to, or involved, an unreasonable application of clearly established Fed-
eral law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) re-
sulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 
Id. § 2254(d)(1). 
3 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410–11. 
4 See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011). 
5 649 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 414 (2011). 
6 See, e.g., Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit, by reviewing the 
lower court decision in a manner closer to direct than deferential review, “disclose[d] an 
improper understanding of [section] 2254(d)’s unreasonableness standard”); Uttecht v. 
Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 10 (2007) (holding that the AEDPA requires federal courts to accord 
deference to state decisions and, by not according this proper level of deference, the 
Ninth Circuit failed to respect the limited role of federal habeas relief); Woodford v. Vis-
ciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (reversing the Ninth Circuit’s decision because it substituted 
its own judgment for that of the state court). 
7 See Ryan v. Doody (Doody IV ), 132 S. Ct. 414, 414 (2011) (denying certiorari); Wil-
liams, 529 U.S. at 410. 
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 Part I of this Comment summarizes the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Doody III.8 Part II then examines the analytical structure of the court’s 
decision in light of Supreme Court precedent.9 Finally, Part III evalu-
ates the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Doody III and argues that the court 
misapplied the AEDPA standard of review; further, it suggests how the 
Supreme Court could close the loophole that the Ninth Circuit contin-
ues to exploit.10 
I. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Doody III 
A. Doody Found Guilty of Temple Murders 
 In the summer of 1991, Maricopa County, Arizona was rocked by 
one of the largest mass killings in the county’s history.11 On August 10, 
1991, nine individuals were murdered inside the Wat Promkunaram 
Buddhist Temple located west of Phoenix, including six monks, a nun, 
and two acolytes.12 The case investigators initially received an anony-
mous tip implicating four men from Tucson (the “Tucson Four”) and, 
during interrogations, these four men eventually confessed.13 Nearly 
one month after these confessions, however, the police located the 
murder weapon, dropped all charges against the Tucson Four, and 
shifted the focus of the investigation onto Jonathan Doody, a seventeen-
year-old high school student.14 Police officers approached Doody on 
October 25, 1991 at a high school football game.15 After he voluntarily 
accompanied the police officers to the station, Doody was interrogated 
for nearly thirteen consecutive hours and eventually confessed to par-
ticipating in the murders.16 
 The state charged Doody and his friend Alessandro Garcia with 
the “Temple murders.”17 Prior to trial, Doody moved to suppress his 
confession on the grounds that the warnings he was given were inade-
                                                                                                                      
8 See infra notes 11–39 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 40–91 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 92–120 and accompanying text. 
11 See Shandra Martinez et al., 9 Found Slain in Valley Temple Buddhist Monks, Nun Were 
“Executed,” Ariz. Republic (Aug. 11, 1991, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/12news/ 
news/articles/2008/11/20/20081120templemurdersbackground112008-CR.html. 
12 Id. 
13 Doody III, 649 F.3d at 991. 
14 Id. at 991 n.2 (noting that the State dropped all charges against the Tucson Four 
and never disputed that the Tucson Four’s confessions were false). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 State v. Doody (Doody I ), 930 P.2d 440, 444 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). 
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quate under the standard created by the U.S. Supreme Court in its 
1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona.18 The trial court conducted a ten-
day suppression hearing and ultimately denied both motions.19 Garcia 
subsequently pled guilty to nine counts of murder and agreed to testify 
against Doody pursuant to a plea agreement.20 The jury convicted 
Doody on nine counts of first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 
nine consecutive life terms.21 He challenged the trial court’s decision, 
arguing that the trial court erred by failing to suppress his confession.22 
The Arizona Court of Appeals, with a cursory glance at the facts, con-
cluded that the trial court did not err in finding that the officers ad-
vised Doody of his Miranda rights in a clear and understandable man-
ner.23 The court emphasized that it was required to heed great defer-
ence to the trial court’s rulings because of its access to certain 
intangible evidence, specifically witness credibility, which could not be 
reproduced on appeal.24 
B. The Ninth Circuit Grants Doody Habeas Relief 
 After exhausting his potential remedies in state court, Doody filed 
for federal habeas relief.25 Although the federal district court affirmed 
the state court’s rulings, the Ninth Circuit eventually provided Doody 
with the relief that he sought.26 On February 25, 2010, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded, in Doody v. Schriro (Doody II ), that the detective’s warn-
ings to Doody undermined the policy behind Miranda and that it was 
unreasonable for the state court to have decided otherwise.27 Thus, 
under the AEDPA, habeas relief was appropriate.28 On remand from 
                                                                                                                      
18 Id. at 444, 445, 448; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding 
that, before questioning, suspects must be warned of the right to remain silent, that any 
statement made may be used as evidence against them, and that they have the right to the 
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed). This Comment focuses exclusively 
on the issue of the Miranda warnings and does not address the issue of the voluntariness of 
Doody’s confession. 
19 Doody I, 930 P.2d at 444. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 444–45. 
22 Id. at 445, 448. 
23 Id. at 449 (addressing the facts for only two paragraphs before deferring to the trial 
court’s ruling). 
24 Id. at 445 n.3. 
25 Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1001. 
26 Id. 
27 596 F.3d 620, 637 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. Ryan v. Doody, 131 S. 
Ct. 456 (2010) (remanding back to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of 
Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1213 (2010)). 
28 Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
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the Supreme Court in Doody III, the Ninth Circuit reached the same 
conclusion.29 
 In determining that the state court had unreasonably applied Su-
preme Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit engaged in a lengthy expla-
nation of the facts of the case.30 The court explained that the Miranda 
warnings the officers gave Doody misinformed him of his constitutional 
right to counsel.31 The investigators’ most notable mistake, according 
to the Ninth Circuit, came when the detective instructed Doody that he 
had the right to counsel “if [he was] involved in it . . . but if [he was], 
then that’s what that would apply to . . . .”32 The court opined that this 
was tantamount to explaining to Doody that he was entitled to an at-
torney only if he had committed the crime of which he was being ac-
cused.33 Additionally, the majority emphasized that the detectives’ ex-
planation of the Miranda form consumed twelve pages of transcript 
when it should have been no more than a page.34 The Ninth Circuit 
held that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the Miranda 
warnings were clear and understandable was both an unreasonable de-
termination of the facts and an unreasonable application of Supreme 
Court precedent.35 Accordingly, the court granted Doody habeas cor-
pus.36 
 On October 12, 2010, the Supreme Court granted certioriari, va-
cated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, and remanded the case for 
further consideration in light of its 2010 decision, Florida v. Powell, in 
which the Court held a Miranda warning sufficient.37 On remand in 
Doody III, the Ninth Circuit affirmed its prior ruling and submitted a 
nearly identical opinion—it decided that Powell was easily distinguish-
                                                                                                                      
29 649 F.3d at 990. 
30 See id. at 990–1001. 
31 Id. at 1003. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 1006 (describing the detectives’ twelve-page explanation of the one-page 
Miranda form as “the very antithesis of clarity”). 
35 Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1003. Additionally, the court concluded that the detectives 
erred by repeatedly describing the Miranda warnings as beneficial to both Doody and the 
detectives. Id. at 1004–05. The Ninth Circuit determined that the detectives had inappro-
priately characterized these warnings as mutually beneficial, when, in fact, the Miranda 
warnings were more accurately described as preserving the defendant’s valuable constitu-
tional rights. Id. 
36 Id. at 1007. 
37 Ryan v. Doody, 131 S. Ct. 456, 456 (2010); see Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1213 (holding that 
the warnings that the suspect had “the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any ques-
tions” and that he could invoke this right “at any time” satisfied Miranda because it rea-
sonably conveyed the Miranda rights to the suspect). 
36 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
able on its facts and saw no need to alter its Miranda analysis from Doody 
II.38 The State of Arizona again petitioned the Supreme Court for cer-
tiorari, but, on October 11, 2011, the Supreme Court denied certio-
rari.39 
II. The Two Layers of Analysis in Doody III 
 The Doody III court employed a two-layer analytical structure in 
reaching its decision to grant federal habeas relief under the AEDPA.40 
First, it reviewed the facts of Doody’s case in light of the Supreme 
Court’s 1966 decision, Miranda v. Arizona, and its progeny, and deter-
mined that the suspect’s warnings were constitutionally deficient.41 
Second, the Doody III court evaluated the state court’s treatment of the 
Miranda issue and concluded that, under the AEDPA, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals’ decision was unreasonable and not merely incor-
rect.42 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit granted Doody habeas relief.43 
This Part situates the Doody III court’s two-layer analysis within the rele-
vant Supreme Court precedent.44 
A. The Doody III Court First Analyzed the Detective’s Miranda Warnings 
1. Subjective Analysis of the Adequacy of Miranda Warnings 
 In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that, before police initiate 
questioning, they must warn suspects: (1) that they have the right to re-
main silent, (2) that any statement made may be used as evidence 
against them, and (3) that they have the right to counsel, either re-
                                                                                                                      
38 See Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1005. Both the majority and the dissent concluded that Pow-
ell, which merely reiterated the requirement that Miranda warnings clearly convey a sus-
pect’s right to counsel, would not change their analyses and was easily distinguishable on 
the facts. See id. at 1005–06; id. at 1037 (Tallman, J., dissenting). Consequently, the analysis 
in Doody III was functionally identical to that in Doody II. Compare Doody II, 596 F.3d at 634–
37 (holding that the detectives did not reasonably convey to Doody his right to counsel 
based on relevant Miranda case law), with Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1002–07 (holding that the 
detectives did not reasonably convey to Doody his right to counsel based on relevant 
Miranda case law, including Powell ). 
39 Doody IV, 132 S. Ct. at 414. 
40 649 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 414 (2011). 
41 Id. at 1003. The relevant warning in this case is the third warning of Miranda that 
requires law enforcement officials to convey to the person in custody of “the right to the 
presence of an attorney.” See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); Doody III, 649 
F.3d at 1009. 
42 649 F.3d at 1007. 
43 Id. 
44 See infra notes 45–91 and accompanying text. 
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tained or appointed.45 The relevant Miranda warning in Doody III was 
the third warning.46 Although the third Miranda warning requires po-
lice to convey to a suspect the right to counsel, the Supreme Court does 
not require police to use any specific phrase or combination of words to 
do so.47 For example, in California v. Prysock, a 1981 case, and Duckworth 
v. Eagan, a 1989 case, the Supreme Court explained that “no talismanic 
incantation” is necessary to give sufficient warnings.48 In Prysock and 
Duckworth, the Court held that, to determine whether police officers 
adequately explained the right to counsel, “the inquiry is simply 
whether the warnings reasonably conve[yed] to [the suspect] . . . rights 
as required by Miranda.”49 Accordingly, courts must look at the warnings 
in their totality to determine if they are adequate; an isolated deviation 
from a traditional script will not render the warnings defective.50 
 Moreover, in 2010, in Florida v. Powell, the Supreme Court further 
emphasized the importance of considering the totality of the circum-
stances when analyzing the adequacy of Miranda warnings.51 In Powell, 
after the police officers had the defendant in custody they informed 
him: “You have the right to talk to a lawyer before answering any of our 
questions.”52 The Florida Supreme Court had determined that this 
Miranda warning was misleading because it suggested to the defendant 
that he was entitled to counsel before questioning, but not through the 
entire process.53 The Supreme Court reversed, however, explaining 
that the Florida Supreme Court had mistakenly focused on one state-
ment made by the officer instead of considering the totality of all the 
statements.54 When looking at the totality of the circumstances, includ-
                                                                                                                      
 
45 384 U.S. at 444. 
46 Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1002–03. 
47 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; see Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1205 (2010); Duckworth 
v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202–03 (1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 361 (1981). 
48 See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202–03 (quoting Prystock, 453 U.S. at 359) (holding that 
courts do not need to scrutinize Miranda warnings “as if construing a will or defining the 
terms of an easement” because the proper inquiry is whether the warnings reasonably 
convey the Miranda rights to the suspect); Prysock, 453 U.S. at 359, 361 (explaining that, in 
determining whether Miranda warnings were adequate, the proper inquiry is if the warn-
ings reasonably convey the rights to the suspect). 
49 Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 203 (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
50 Id. at 202–03. 
51 See 130 S. Ct. at 1205. 
52 Id. at 1199–1200. 
53 Florida v. Powell, 998 So. 2d 531, 541 (Fla. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010). 
54 Powell, 130 S. Ct. at 1205. Specifically, the Court noted that the police officer made a 
second statement in which he informed the suspect of “the right to use any . . . rights at 
any time . . . during th[e] interview.” Id. at 1204–05. When viewed in combination, these 
38 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
ing the verbal and written statements given to the defendant, the 
Miranda warnings in Powell were adequate.55 Thus, Powell demonstrates 
that even a potentially misleading statement will not necessarily render 
the Miranda warning deficient.56 Instead, the court must determine, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, whether the police reasona-
bly conveyed the Miranda rights to the defendant.57 
                                                                                                                     
2. The Doody III Court’s Conclusion that the Miranda Warnings Were 
Inadequate 
 The Doody III court held that Doody’s Miranda warnings failed to 
properly notify him of his constitutional right to the presence of an at-
torney.58 The Doody III court distinguished Powell by asserting that, in 
giving Doody’s Miranda warning, the detectives departed to a point that 
bordered on confusing the suspect.59 In particular, the court focused 
on one statement made by the detective, in which he implied that 
Doody had the right to counsel only if he was involved in the crime.60 
Unlike in Powell, in which the warnings did not ultimately suggest any 
limitation on the right to counsel, in Doody III the detective “expressly 
and affirmatively limited” the suspect’s right to counsel.61 Accordingly, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the detective’s “misleading and unin-
telligible” commentary came “nowhere close to the Miranda standard 
mandating clarity” and thus was constitutionally deficient.62 
B. Was the State Court’s Decision Unreasonable Under the AEDPA? 
1. Ambiguous Language to Clarify an Amorphous AEDPA Standard 
 Under the AEDPA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court’s 2000 
decision in Williams v. Taylor, the Ninth Circuit could not have granted 
 
two warnings conveyed all the necessary aspects of the third Miranda warning. See id. at 
1205; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
55 130 S. Ct. at 1205–06. Specifically, the Supreme Court emphasized that, although 
the officers did not communicate the third Miranda warning in the clearest way possible, 
their statements were sufficient when given a “commonsense reading.” Id. at 1205. 
56 Id. at 1205–06. 
57 See id. at 1205; Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202–03; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361. 
58 See 649 F.3d at 1003. 
59 Id. at 1006. 
60 Id. at 1002–03. The detective instructed Doody that he had the right to counsel “if 
you were involved in [the crime] . . . but if you were, then that’s what that would apply to 
. . . .” Id. at 1003. 
61 Id. at 1005. 
62 Id. at 1006, 1007. 
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habeas relief in Doody III if the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision was 
merely erroneous.63 Instead, habeas relief was predicated on whether 
the state court’s application of Miranda was “unreasonable.”64 Although 
the Supreme Court provided scant guidance in Williams on what consti-
tutes an unreasonable—as opposed to a simply incorrect decision—it 
has since provided further direction.65 For example, the Supreme Court 
has established that federal habeas relief under the AEDPA should be 
difficult to obtain because such relief is designed to protect only against 
extreme malfunctions by the state courts and not ordinary errors.66 
 The Supreme Court first interpreted section 2254(d)(1) in Wil-
liams to require federal courts to withhold habeas relief for state court 
decisions that are incorrect but not unreasonable.67 In Williams, the 
defendant filed a habeas petition in federal court, claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel under the standard established in the Court’s 
1984 decision, Strickland v. Washington.68 After granting certiorari in 
Williams, the Court held that the defendant had met the requirements 
of the AEDPA.69 Nonetheless, although Williams afforded the Court an 
opportunity to clarify the broad language of section 2254(d)(1) for 
lower courts, it did not take full advantage.70 Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, writing for the Court, explained two different ways in which 
a state court can unreasonably apply clearly established federal Su-
preme Court law.71 First, the state court could properly identify the rule 
of law, but then unreasonably apply that law to the facts of the case; or, 
second, the state court could either unreasonably extend a legal prin-
ciple when it should not apply or unreasonably fail to extend a legal 
principle when it should apply.72 Although the majority distinguished 
                                                                                                                      
63 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 367 (2000); see 
also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; Doody III, 649 F.3d at 990. 
64 See § 2254(d)(1); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; Doody III, 649 F.3d at 990. 
65 See 529 U.S. at 367; see also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011); Yarbor-
ough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). 
66 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664; see § 2254(d)(1). 
67 529 U.S. at 367, 411. 
68 Williams, 529 U.S. 370–71; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) 
(holding that, to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a defendant 
must show that the counsel’s performance was deficient and that this deficient perform-
ance prejudiced the defense). 
69 Williams, 529 U.S. at 367; see § 2254(d)(1). 
70 See Willliams, 529 U.S. at 407; see also Padraic Foran, Notes, Unreasonably Wrong: The 
Supreme Court’s Supremacy, the AEDPA Standard, and Carey v. Musladin, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
571, 592 (2008) (noting that the Williams opinion injected more confusion into the al-
ready confusing habeas analysis). 
71 Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. 
72 Id. 
40 Boston College Law Review Vol. 53: E. Supp. 
two types of unreasonableness, it failed to explain when a state court’s 
rulings would be “unreasonable” instead of simply “incorrect.”73 Justice 
O’Connor did, however, insist that “unreasonable” is different from 
“incorrect.”74 
 The Supreme Court offered further guidance to lower federal 
courts as to when an incorrect decision is more likely than not to be 
unreasonable in its 2004 decision, Yarborough v. Alvarado.75 Yet, the 
Court used ambiguous language in attempting to clarify this already 
amorphous standard.76 According to the Yarborough Court, federal 
courts should look at how general or specific the law is that the state 
court applied.77 On the one hand, a specific legal rule, such as banning 
alcohol to persons under the age of twenty-one, minimizes judicial dis-
cretion by requiring particular outcomes when judges are presented 
with particular facts.78 On the other hand, a more general legal stan-
dard, such as whether probable cause existed for an arrest, provides 
significant judicial discretion and allows judges to import their own 
subjective opinions.79 Thus, if a court has greater discretion in its deci-
sion then it is less likely that its decision was “unreasonable.”80 
 Furthermore, in its 2011 opinion Harrington v. Richter, in which the 
Court held that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied the AEDPA’s unrea-
sonableness standard, the Court went beyond discussing mere likeli-
hoods and attempted to create a workable standard for what constitutes 
an “unreasonable” decision.81 The Court explained that a petitioner 
must show that the state court’s ruling contained “an error well under-
stood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement.”82 Therefore, before declaring a state court 
decision unreasonable under section 2254(d)(1), a federal court 
should determine if the state court was wrong and that no fair-minded 
                                                                                                                      
73 See id. at 410–11. 
74 Id. 
75 541 U.S. at 663–64; see Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787. 
76 See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663–64. 
77 Id. at 664. 
78 Id.; see Todd E. Pettys, Federal Habeas Relief and the New Tolerance for “Reasonably Errone-
ous” Applications of Federal Law, 63 Ohio St L.J. 731, 790 (2002) (explaining the difference 
between specific “rules” and general “standards” when analyzing the range of potential 
outcomes in a particular case). 
79 Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664; see Pettys, supra note 78, at 791. 
80 Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664; see Pettys, supra note 78, at 791. 
81 131 S. Ct. at 787 (concluding that the Ninth Circuit erred in overturning the state 
court’s decision regarding effective assistance of counsel without using the proper defer-
ential standard). 
82 Id. at 786–87. 
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jurist could disagree that it was wrong.83 In Richter, the Court criticized 
the Ninth Circuit for conducting a de novo review of the case and then, 
without further explanation, declaring that the state court’s decision 
had been unreasonable.84 According to the Court, this lack of defer-
ence undermined the purpose of section 2254(d)(1).85 
 Although Richter provided another opportunity for the Court to 
clarify its amorphous standard, the Court again failed to use precise lan-
guage, for it is unclear how a reviewing court would determine if there is 
any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.86 Thus, the Richter stan-
dard is still subject to significant judicial discretion—different people 
can have different opinions on whether or not fair-minded people 
would disagree on a particular issue.87 The Court did make one thing 
clear, however: federal habeas relief should be difficult to obtain, espe-
cially when reviewing a state court’s application of a general legal rule.88 
                                                                                                                     
2. The Doody III Court’s Application of AEDPA Unreasonableness 
 In Doody III, the Ninth Circuit laid the correct foundation for a 
proper inquiry under the AEDPA by acknowledging that it could only 
overturn the state court’s decision if that decision was unreasonable.89 
Yet, the majority only discussed this standard once more in the opinion 
when it asserted “the responsibility that federal judges have to grant 
habeas relief if Supreme Court precedent has been unreasonably ap-
plied.”90 After holding that the reading of Doody’s Miranda rights was 
defective, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no fair-minded jurist could 
reach a different conclusion and declared that “whatever the applicable 
standard for reviewing the state court decision,” it was compelled to 
grant habeas relief in this case because the Miranda violation was so 
egregious.91 
 
83 Id. at 786. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 786; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
86 See 131 S. Ct. at 786. 
87 See id. 
88 Id.; Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664; see § 2254(d)(1). 
89 649 F.3d at 1002; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 (holding that the proper inquiry un-
der the AEDPA is whether the state court decision was unreasonable as opposed to incor-
rect). 
90 See Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1006. 
91 Id. at 1007 (emphasis added); see Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
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III. Closing the Loophole Created by an Ambiguous 
Unreasonableness Standard 
 By reversing the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision for a second 
time in Doody III, the Ninth Circuit once again displayed an improper 
understanding of the AEDPA.92 When considering a federal habeas 
petition under the AEDPA, a federal court must consider the general-
ity or specificity of the applied law—the more general the rule, the 
more leeway the state court has in reaching its decision.93 The gener-
ality of the law regarding Miranda warnings was laid out in the Su-
preme Court’s 2010 decision, Florida v. Powell, in which the Court held 
that a judgment on the adequacy of Miranda warnings necessarily in-
volves some degree of subjectivity.94 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
has emphasized that a court should review Miranda warnings in their 
totality to determine their adequacy.95 Thus, Supreme Court prece-
dent suggests that the rules governing Miranda warnings are fairly 
general.96 
 The Ninth Circuit erred in Doody III by failing to consider either 
the generality of the Miranda rules or the totality of the circumstances 
when analyzing the sufficiency of Miranda warnings.97 In particular, 
the court inappropriately focused on one statement made by the de-
tectives during their interrogation, and only briefly mentioned the 
full Miranda form provided to Doody and the dialogue accompanying 
the detectives’ explanation of it to him, which comprised twelve pages 
                                                                                                                      
92 See 649 F.3d 986, 1002–07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 414 (2011); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); see also, e.g., McDaniel v. Brown, 130 S. Ct. 665, 673 (2010) 
(“[T]he [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals’ discussion of the . . . evidence departed from 
the deferential review that . . . § 2254(d)(1) demand[s].”); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 
111, 121–23 (2009) (“The [Ninth Circuit] Court of Appeals reached [the wrong] result 
based, in large measure, on its application of an improper standard of review . . . .”); 
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (“An unreasonable application of federal law 
is different from an incorrect application of federal law. The Ninth Circuit did not observe 
this distinction, but ultimately substituted its own judgment for that of the state court, in 
contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). 
93 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (explaining that, when applying a 
general standard to a specific case, the trial court must employ a substantial element of 
judgment that is not present when the trial court is applying a bright-line standard); see 
§ 2254(d)(1). 
94 See 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1205 (2010). 
95 See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202–03 (1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 
355, 361 (1981). 
96 See supra notes 45–57 and accompanying text. 
97 See 649 F.3d at 1002–07; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); supra 
notes 89–91 and accompanying text. 
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of script.98 Although the majority decided that this lengthy explana-
tion provided more confusion than clarity to the suspect, a fair-
minded jurist could reasonably find that, because the detectives en-
gaged in such a detailed explanation, they reasonably conveyed to 
Doody his rights under Miranda.99 The Ninth Circuit failed to prop-
erly take into account how general the law is in this area, and thus 
how deferential their review should be.100 Given such a subjective in-
quiry, the range of reasonable conclusions is necessarily quite 
broad.101 
 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit looked so closely at the facts of the 
case that the review could be more aptly described as de novo rather 
than deferential.102 In fact, the Ninth Circuit appeared to substitute 
its own judgment for that of the state court in a manner similar to 
that which the Supreme Court chastised in its 2011 decision, Harring-
ton v. Richter.103 After engaging in its own Miranda analysis and con-
cluding that it disagreed with the state court’s analysis, the Ninth Cir-
cuit declared that no fair-minded jurist could disagree with its deter-
mination.104 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit’s perfunctory treatment 
of the state court’s decision detracts from the validity of its holding.105 
Thus, by failing to adequately consider whether the state court’s deci-
sion was unreasonable, the Ninth Circuit undermined the respect for 
state decisions imbedded in section 2254(d)(1).106 
                                                                                                                     
 The Ninth Circuit was able to ignore the Supreme Court’s cues to 
afford great deference to the state court decision in Doody III because of 
the Supreme Court’s amorphous unreasonableness standard.107 The 
term “unreasonable” means different things to different people in dif-
 
98 See Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202–03; Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361; Doody III, 649 F.3d at 
1002–06. 
99 See Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1002–06; see also Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 202–03; Prysock, 453 
U.S. at 361. 
100 See Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1002–07; see also Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664. 
101 See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011); Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1002–07. 
102 See Doody III, 649 F.3d at 990–1002; see also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 
103 See Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1007; see also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 
104 See Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1007; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
105 See Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1007; see also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 
106 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1002–07; see also Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410–11 (2000) (emphasizing the deferential nature of habeas review 
through its distinction between “incorrect” and “unreasonable” state decisions); Kemper, 
supra note 2, at 1. 
107 Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664; Williams, 529 U.S. at 410–11. 
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ferent contexts.108 Different judges will come to different determina-
tions of whether or not fair-minded jurists could disagree with their de-
cisions.109 Despite the Supreme Court’s efforts at clarification, the 
AEDPA standard of review for habeas petitions is a subjective concept 
that depends on the individual opinions of the judges involved.110 
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit can recite the correct legal standard un-
der the AEDPA, as it did in Doody III, and then grant the habeas peti-
tion for any reason because the term “unreasonable” has no clear defi-
nition.111 Although Congress intended to curb the number of success-
ful habeas petitions through its passage of the AEDPA, this amorphous 
unreasonableness standard does not guarantee that result, for it allows 
the Ninth Circuit to grant habeas petitions for almost any reason.112 
 To close this loophole and reign in the Ninth Circuit, the Su-
preme Court should clarify the unreasonableness standard with a two-
step process.113 First, the reviewing court should determine if the state 
court was applying a bright-line legal rule or a rule that requires some 
degree of judicial discretion.114 When the state court applies a bright-
line legal rule, such as prohibiting the sale of alcohol to those under 
twenty-one, then the reviewing court may grant the habeas petition 
for an incorrect state court decision.115 In contrast, when the state 
court applies a general rule requiring some degree of judicial discre-
tion, such as determining the adequacy of Miranda warnings, then the 
                                                                                                                      
108 See Pettys, supra note 78, at 768–82 (explaining how “unreasonable” can take on dif-
ferent meanings under frameworks of different jurisprudential philosophies, such as for-
malism, skepticism, and conventionalism). 
109 See Pettys, supra note 78, at 768–82. See generally Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispo-
sitive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 759, 777–78 (2009). 
110 See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664; Williams, 529 U.S. at 410–
11; Pettys, supra note 78, at 768–82. 
111 See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664; Williams, 529 U.S. at 410–
11; Doody III, 649 F.3d at 1006. 
112 Kemper, supra note 2, at 1; see John H. Blume, AEDPA: The Hype and the Bite, 91 
Cornell L. Rev. 259, 272–73 (2006) (explaining that the Supreme Court has remained 
largely silent regarding the unreasonableness standard of the AEDPA and has conse-
quently allowed state courts to inject their own interpretations). 
113 See McDaniel, 130 S. Ct. at 673 (admonishing the Ninth Circuit for not applying the 
proper level of deference to the state court’s decision); Knowles, 556 U.S. at 121–23 (ex-
plaining that the Ninth Circuit has an improper understanding of the AEDPA); Woodford, 
537 U.S. at 25 (criticizing the Ninth Circuit for substituting its own judgment for that of 
the state court). 
114 See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664; Pettys, supra note 78, at 789–93 (contending that an 
essential element of a proper AEDPA analytical framework is considering the general or 
specific nature of the rule being analyzed because this is the most significant predictor of 
whether a decision is “unreasonable” or not). 
115 See Pettys, supra note 78, at 789–93. 
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reviewing court may not grant the habeas petition unless the court 
unanimously decides that the state court’s decision was unreason-
able.116 
 This clear standard would more effectively fulfill the goals of the 
AEDPA because it would force federal courts to show immense defer-
ence to the decisions of state courts, and it would significantly reduce 
the number of habeas petitions clogging the federal system.117 Peti-
tioners would not be completely at the mercy of state courts, however, 
because federal judges would often unanimously agree to overturn 
especially egregious state decisions.118 Furthermore, petitioners can 
still appeal state court decisions by requesting executive clemency.119 
Regardless, the Supreme Court should more cogently explain the 
meaning of “unreasonable” under the AEDPA, lest the Ninth Circuit 
continue to grant habeas relief without the proper deference to state 
court decisions.120 
Conclusion 
 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Doody III is the latest in a long 
line of Ninth Circuit decisions to improperly apply the standard of 
review required for habeas cases under the AEDPA. After its inception 
in 1996, the AEDPA created confusion throughout federal courts. In 
recognition of this, the Supreme Court has provided lower federal 
courts with guidance on the proper interpretation of the AEDPA. The 
Ninth Circuit, however, has repeatedly failed to follow the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in this area, and has consistently declined to 
grant state courts the proper level of deference. Although the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari in this case, the Court should clarify 
                                                                                                                      
116 Compare Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 614–15 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that, de-
spite an incorrect determination, the state court’s determination was not unreasonable 
because it was a “close issue”), with Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 630 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(concluding that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was so obvious and fell “so 
wide of the mark” that the state court’s decision must have been unreasonable). 
117 See Jackson, supra note 2, at 2449–50; Kemper, supra note 2, at 1; Meade, supra note 
2, at 132. 
118 See Pettys, supra note 78, at 797 (positing that federal courts are more likely to grant 
federal habeas relief when the applicant has proved a case by a wide margin). 
119 Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 7 (2011) (reversing a Ninth Circuit decision and de-
nying a petitioner habeas relief, but stating that the petitioner can still seek clemency, an 
important avenue “to help ensure that justice is tempered by mercy”). 
120 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006); Doody III, 649 F.3d at 990; see also Williams, 529 
U.S. at 410–11; Ryan v. Doody (Doody IV ), 132 S. Ct. 414, 414 (2011). 
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the term “unreasonable” in the context of the AEDPA to prevent the 
Ninth Circuit from taking advantage of this ambiguous language. 
Drew N. Goodwin 
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